Beyond “The Hero as Prophet”: A Survey of Images of Islam

Albert D. Pionke
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

Thomas Carlyle’s lecture, “The Hero as Prophet. Mahomet: Islam,” delivered on May 8, 1840, and later included in On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841) as that volume’s second lecture, is frequently cited as the beginning of the modern British reappraisal of Islam and its prophet. Michael K. Goldberg asserts, “the revolution in historical estimates of Muhammed since the later part of the nineteenth century must be attributed in large measure to the influence of Carlyle’s lecture” (xliii). Approaching Carlyle from a contemporary Arab-Islamic scholarly perspective, Muhammed A. Al-Da’mi agrees, writing that the “significance of Carlyle’s lecture, within the dominant climate of Western misconceptions, stems from the fact that it is a rare document of great literary merit which attempts a revaluation of established attitudes” (84). Even Carlyle felt he was offering “altogether a new kind of thing” and later described the lecture as “the best

1On Carlyle’s role in improving Western perceptions of Islam, see Paul E. Kerry; Edward W. Said (152); and W. Montgomery Watt. The argument offered here to a certain extent parallels that proposed by Kerry even as it radically expands his frame of reference, thereby revealing in greater detail
I ever delivered” (Collected Letters 12:139, 142). In the face of such praise, one is almost embarrassed to recall passages from “The Hero as Prophet” such as the following:

He [Mahomet] is by no means the truest of Prophets;  
Islam is definable as a confused form of Christianity;  
The truth of [Mahomet’s Creed] is embedded in portentous error and falsehood;  
Nothing but a sense of duty could carry any European through the Koran;  
We will not praise Mahomet’s moral precepts as always of the superfine sort. (Heroes 38, 49, 54, 56, 63)

Read outside of their immediate contexts, these passages suggest an attitude towards Islam strikingly at odds with the defense of Mahomet cited by Goldberg and Al-Da’mi. However, that defense is also too often read outside the context of Carlyle’s comments on Islam throughout Heroes and other works. In order to provide a basis for a more nuanced investigation into his role in Victorian perceptions of and political relations with followers of the dominant religion of the Near East, a reconstruction of the complex image of Islam that emerges from Carlyle’s collected works seems necessary.²

Carlyle’s references to Islam throughout his work vary widely in tone, detail, and rhetorical purpose. “The Hero as Prophet” is his only substantive engagement with Islam, and even it is limited to a biographical concentration on Mahomet offered in the service of a larger argument about the continuity of the heroic spirit. All of his other uses of Islamic signifiers are incidental and overwhelmingly determined by their immediate rhetorical contexts. Most are positive, if occasional, and provide him with a chance to critique what he saw as the degenera-

²Securing the overland route to India had forced the British into prolonged contact with the Islamic world of the Near East since the later eighteenth century. By the 1840s the British had made contact, sometimes violently, with followers of Islam in present-day Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
tion of nineteenth-century England by comparing it unfavorably with some aspect of Islamic culture. One approach to these references is to arrange them in a series of concentric circles, beginning with “The Hero as Prophet” and expanding outward first through the rest of Heroes and then through his other works. Each circle then provides a context that modifies and often complicates the images of Islam previously discussed.


Carlyle begins this lecture by establishing a conceptual frame for its reader-listeners. First, he proposes a progressive chronology for heroism: not merely “the second phasis of Hero-worship,” Islamic Arabia represents an “advance” of “progress” over pagan Scandinavia (Heroes 37). Crucially, this progress lies not in “the Great Man” himself, who, “as he comes from the hand of Nature, is ever the same kind of thing” (38), but rather in the epoch in which the Great Man appears. For Carlyle, the variety of hero-worship that a people manifests towards its Great Man provides “a little window, into the very heart of these men’s spiritual condition” (37). Since the Great Man never changes, subsequent epochs’ responses to earlier heroes can also be used to judge their later spiritual condition, to determine whether the progress made from Scandinavia to Arabia has continued. Mahomet, then, will not be investigated for his own sake, but, ultimately, for the purpose of judging Victorian England by its reaction to him.

Carlyle soon makes clear that his fellow Victorians’ opinion of Mahomet indicates that they have strayed from the path of progress through proper hero-worship. “Our current hypothesis about Mahomet,” he writes, “that he was a scheming Impostor, a False-hood incarnate, that his religion is a mere mass of quackery and fatuity, begins really to be now untenable to any one. The lies, which well-meaning zeal has heaped round this man, are disgraceful to ourselves only” (38). He elaborates on English stereotypes of Mahomet and Islam in subsequent passages, revealing that Victorians attributed to Mahomet “Inanity and Theatricality,” thought him “a poor conscious ambitious
schemer” (40), and objected to Islam on the grounds of its supposed sensuousness and its violent methods of conversion (60, 53).

To rehabilitate his countrymen’s opinion of Mahomet and Islam, Carlyle employs several rhetorical strategies. Appealing to the combined authority of history, statistics, and divinity, he cites the undisputed longevity and popularity of the faith Mahomet inspired to counter Victorian religious prejudice:

The word this man spoke has been the life-guidance now of one hundred and eighty millions of men these twelve hundred years. These hundred and eighty millions were made by God as well as we. A greater number of God’s creatures believe in Mahomet’s word, at this hour, than in any other word whatever. Are we to suppose that it was a miserable piece of spiritual legerdemain, this which so many creatures of the Almighty have lived by and died by? (39)

Carlyle also repeatedly uses identification to reduce the distance between England and the Islamic world. As Al-Da’mi notes, Carlyle reverses prevalent theories of geographic determinism (72), describing the Arabs as “Oriental Italians. A gifted noble people; a people of wild strong feelings, and of iron restraint over these: the characteristic of noble-mindedness, of genius” (Heroes 42). Although he does character-

1Goldberg offers a brief survey of Victorian stereotypes of Islam (xli); Ruth apRoberts gives a somewhat lengthier account of Western perceptions of the East (88–92); and Al-Da’mi goes into considerably more detail regarding Western (mis)perceptions of the Near East. These stereotypes are revealed in one of the surviving responses to Carlyle’s original lecture in The Biblical Review and Congregational Magazine: “And he actually makes Mahomet representative of the prophets, when upon this weak and empty man (giving him all due merit,) there rested at most but a very moderate amount, if any, of prophetic spirit” (Trela and Tarr 101).

4A much earlier letter to Robert Mitchell, dated 24 May 1815, which compares the effects of climate on Scandinavian and Arab temperaments, suggests that Carlyle once held more conventional opinions of geographic
ize Islam as “a confused form of Christianity,” he also says that the “soul” of both religions shares “Denial of Self, Annihilation of Self. This is yet the highest Wisdom that Heaven has revealed to our Earth” (49). Finally, in a less flattering identification meant to neutralize accusations that Islam is violent, he reminds his audience that, “On the whole, a thing will propagate itself as it can. We do not find, of the Christian Religion either, that it always disdained the sword, when once it had got one” (53).

Carlyle often continues this process of identification at the individual level by describing Mahomet in terms many of his English contemporaries would have applied to themselves. As would have been obvious to English Romantics, so “[t]o [Mahomet’s] eyes it is forever clear that this world is wholly miraculous” (59). For those more impressed by their own straightforwardness, Carlyle declares, “Withal I like Mahomet for his total freedom from cant. He is a rough self-helping son of the wilderness; does not pretend to be what he is not” (62). Finally, acknowledging the cult of earnestness that he had helped to create, he pronounces Mahomet devoid of “Dilettantism. . . . [I]t is a business of Reprobation and Salvation with him, of Time and Eternity; he is in deadly earnest about it!” (63).

Occasionally, Carlyle moves beyond identification, either to edification or metaphorical excess. When relying on the first of these techniques, he offers an aspect of Islamic life—whether devotion to the Koran (55) or belief in and desire to act upon religious precepts (66)—as a model to which Victorian England ought to aspire. Carlyle’s trademark reliance on hyperbolic signification cast in biblical diction to overwhelm his audiences is exemplified in the lecture’s concluding remarks:

These Arabs, the man Mahomet, and that one century,—is it not as if a spark had fallen, one spark, on a world of what seemed black unnoticeable sand; but lo, the sand proves explosive powder, blazes heaven-high from Delhi to Grenada! I said, the Great Man was always as lightning out of Heaven; the rest of men waited for him like fuel, and then they too would flame. (66)
Despite this greatly rehabilitated portrait of Mahomet, to assert that “Carlyle was free from the fetters of the prevalent Orientalist attitudes. . . . His treatment of the Arab past is informed and bias-free” (Al-Da’mi 71) is perhaps too much. Immediately after establishing the general argumentative frame of his theory of heroism, for example, he constructs a secondary specific frame for his discussion of Mahomet:

\[\text{We have chosen Mahomet not as the most eminent Prophet; but as the one we are freest to speak of. He is by no means the truest of Prophets; but I do esteem him a true one. Farther, as there is no danger of our becoming, any of us, Mahometans, I mean to say all the good of him I justly can. (38)}\]

Not only is Mahomet relegated to a purely instrumental role in this opening passage, but he is also readily objectified, only relatively true, and fundamentally incapable of converting English minds by means of his prophetic ability. He is, in other words, not a Great Man but only a great man. Carlyle also sets strategic limits to his technique of identification. For example, the defense he offers of Islam’s supposed sensuousness maintains an almost condescending distance between his readers and the practices he seeks to explain: “The indulgences, criminal to us, which he permitted, were not of his appointment; he found them practised, unquestioned from immemorial time in Arabia; what he did was to curtail them, restrict them, not on one but on many sides” (60).

In his treatment of the Koran, which he had just finished reading in translation, Carlyle’s complex and at times conflicted attitude towards Islam in the lecture becomes most perspicuous. Although he admires the Koran for its sincerity (58), he readily admits that “it is as toilsome reading as ever I undertook. A wearisome confused jumble, crude, incondite; endless iterations, long-windedness, entanglement; most crude, incondite;—insupportable stupidity, in short!” (56). Yet he

\[\text{Carlyle’s reliance on the recurrent metaphor of the Tree of Igdrasil, which overwhelms less than it encourages identification, has been noted by both Al-}\]
quickly seeks to qualify this statement by accounting for “a merit quite other than the literary one” (56–57). Relying at first on rather vague terms such as “genuineness . . . a bonâ-fide book,” he finally arrives at this judgment: “We said ‘stupid’: yet natural stupidity is by no means the character of Mahomet’s Book; it is natural uncultivation rather. . . . The successive utterances of a soul in that mood, colored by the various vicissitudes of three-and-twenty years; now well uttered, now worse: this is the Koran” (57). His tone here is difficult to read—why not delete “stupid” altogether, rather than retracting it in a way that forces him to repeat the insult a second time?—and is reminiscent of Carlyle’s representation of the inarticulate feeling of the working classes in Chartism (1839), but what is clear from this and earlier passages in the lecture is that it might best be described as an instrumental apology for Islam built on backhanded compliments and laced with a considerable degree of ambivalence.

II. On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History

The immediate context provided by Carlyle’s allusions to Islam in the rest of Heroes reinforces the ambivalence already detected in “The Hero as Prophet.” Building on both positive and negative statements made in the lecture, these predominantly incidental references confirm Carlyle’s at best instrumental interest in Mahomet, even as they expose the logical problems created by his technique of framing. They also reveal even further the degree to which Carlyle remained influenced by the very stereotypes he was simultaneously seeking to reform.

At times in Heroes, Carlyle evinces extraordinary respect for Mahomet that echoes the most laudatory judgments from his second lecture. In the first lecture, “The Hero as Divinity,” for example, he anticipates both the general framing and the process of individual identification he employs in the second with his reflections on the universal hero’s attitude towards mortality: “a Destiny inexorable, which it is useless trying to bend or soften, has appointed who is to be slain; this was a fundamental point for the Norse believer;—as indeed it is for
all earnest men everywhere, for a Mahomet, a Luther, for a Napoleon too” (28). Here, Mahomet is both deeply earnest and deserving of being classed among those Carlyle later refers to as “all true men that live, or that ever lived, soldiers of the same army; enlisted, under Heaven’s captaincy, to do battle against the same enemy, the empire of Darkness and Wrong” (103). Mahomet’s earnestness and specifically his zeal against idolatry earn him further praise in the fourth lecture, “The Hero as Priest,” which begins with a discourse on the lamentable inevitability of idol worship. “One of Mahomet’s characteristics, which indeed belongs to all Prophets,” Carlyle explains, “is unlimited implacable zeal against Idolatry,” mockingly defined later as “Sincere-Cant” (103, 105). Not only does this rejection of Idolatry-as-Cant recall “The Hero as Prophet,” but it also allows Carlyle to cast Mahomet and Luther as analogous religious reformers:

Mahomet said, These idols of yours are wood; you put wax and oil on them, the flies stick on them: they are not God, I tell you, they are black wood! Luther said to the Pope, This thing of yours that you call a Pardon of Sins, it is a bit of rag-paper with ink. It is nothing else; it, and so much like it, is nothing else. God alone can pardon sins. (114–15)

In one respect, at least, Mahomet actually surpasses Western heroes, including Carlyle’s beloved Oliver Cromwell: “Theocracy, Government of God, is precisely the thing to be struggled for! All Prophets, zealous Priests, are there for that purpose. Hildebrand wished a Theocracy; Cromwell wished for it, fought for it; Mahomet attained it” (130).

At other times, however, Carlyle is careful not to allow Mahomet too much praise; in fact, “The Hero as Poet,” the third lecture, abruptly cancels several of the positive judgments already made in Mahomet’s favor. Exposing the logical problems in the general framing for the second lecture—preserving the sense of historical progress at the expense of the congruity of the Great Man throughout history—Carlyle repeatedly stresses Dante’s superiority to Mahomet. Ranking the faiths articulated by each man, he observes that “Christianism, as Dante sings it, is an-
other than Paganism in the rude Norse mind; another than ‘Bastard Christianism’ half-articulately spoken in the Arab Desert, seven hundred years before!” (84). He explains this discrepancy as a matter of both intended audience and inherent superiority. For Carlyle,

Mahomet speaks to great masses of men, in the coarse dialect adapted to such; a dialect filled with inconsistencies, crudities, follies: on the great masses alone can he act, and there with good and with evil strangely blended. Dante speaks to the noble, the pure and great, in all times and places. Neither does he grow obsolescent, as the other does. (85)

Although most obviously a pejorative judgment of Mahomet, this statement also indicts “the great masses” who believe Mahomet’s teaching. Muslims, the logic runs, are too “coarse” to appreciate “the noble, the pure and great”; moreover, despite their impressive numbers and the longevity of their faith, they are doomed to obsolescence.

Carlyle continues in this vein when he praises Shakespeare, whose heroic stature is established, in part, at Mahomet’s expense. He deems Shakespeare both “far better” and “more successful” than Mahomet (95), whom, once again, he pronounces destined to become obsolescent. In sharp contrast to the second lecture, Carlyle here identifies as “intrinsically an error” Mahomet’s self-identification as a “‘Prophet of God’” (95). Carlyle’s use of quotation marks in this identification is striking, since it implies that Mahomet does not even belong in the lecture in which he is the principle subject. He also critiques Mahomet as excessively self-conscious: “But as for Mahomet, I think it had been better for him not to be so conscious! Alas, poor Mahomet; all that he was conscious of was a mere error; a futility and triviality,—as indeed such ever is” (95). He even grossly simplifies his previously mixed assessment of the Koran, seeing it as “a stupid piece of prolix absurdity; we do not believe, like him, that God wrote that!” (96). In a breathtaking repudiation of his earlier regard for Mahomet, he openly questions whether Mahomet deserves to be considered a hero at all:
It was intrinsically an error that notion of Mahomet’s, of his supreme Prophethood; and has come down to us inextricably involved in error to this day; dragging along with it such a coil of fables, impurities, intolerances, as makes it a questionable step for me here and now to say, as I have done, that Mahomet was a true Speaker at all, and not rather an ambitious charlatan, perversity and simulacrum; no Speaker, but a Babbler! Even in Arabia, as I compute, Mahomet will have exhausted himself and become obsolete, while this Shakespeare, this Dante may still be young;—while this Shakespeare may still pretend to be a Priest of Mankind, of Arabia as of other places, for unlimited periods to come! (95)

The best one can say of the image of Islam that emerges here is that it may be an attempt to soothe those offended by the revisionist portrait of Mahomet Carlyle offers earlier. Certainly, it exemplifies the degree to which Carlyle remains only tenuously invested in the reformation of popular prejudice and willing to sacrifice Mahomet on the altar of Shakespeare’s greatness.

III. CARLYLE’S COLLECTED WORKS AND BEYOND

Although they often anticipate or echo many of the individual statements about Mahomet made in Heroes, the references to Islam found in Carlyle’s other work provide a much broader and, overall, more positive context through which to understand his attitude towards the faith. Without exception, figurations of Islam outside of Heroes are incidental and collectively range much more widely through the Islamic world for their cultural referents. Often, Carlyle chooses from among this range of referents an example he can use, by analogy, to illustrate the shortcomings of British culture. Such analogical pairings usually, but not always, show the Arab-Islamic world in a positive light relative to British society. At other times, he simply alludes to some aspect of Arab-Islamic culture in passing; again, rarely are such casual allusions negative. Even in such broader and more positive contexts, however, Carlyle continues to deploy images of Islam opportunistically and in-
strumentally, never treating Islam as a subject worthy of study in itself; he also occasionally, although apparently unconsciously, reifies long-standing stereotypes of the Near East.

Images of Islam in Carlyle’s works most often appear as analogies of England, almost evenly divided between contrasting and comparative pairings, with the contrasts, all published after *Heroes*, most consistently representing the Arab-Islamic world in a positive light. In *Past and Present* (1843), for example, Carlyle returns directly to the subject of *Heroes* when he illustrates the lamentable state of hero-worship in his home country by contrasting the fate of “Burns an Exciseman” in England with “Mahomet a Prophet of God” in the Near East (37). More vituperatively, in “Hudson’s Statue,” one of the *Latter-Day Pamphlets* (1850), he excoriates as the worst type of idolatry the impulse of some in England to erect a statue in honor of George Hudson, the railway king. Recalling Mahomet’s smashing of the Idol of Somnauth, Carlyle offers a vivid contrast between such righteous zeal against false gods and England’s “[t]ranscendent admiration!” for a railroad speculator (257). The Islamic world even appears in Carlyle’s relatively late essay on “The Opera,” in which, after praising music as “a vehicle for worship, for prophecy, and for whatsoever . . . was divine,” he declares, “Reader, it was actually so in Greek, in Roman, in Moslem, Christian, most of all in Old-Hebrew times: and if you look how it now is, you will find a change that should astonish you” (397). All of these examples offer some aspect of Islamic culture worthy of emulation for an England whose sacred instincts have become sadly profaned.

Carlyle’s comparative analogies, in works both before and after *Heroes*, are somewhat more ambiguous in their treatment of Islam. The first appears in “Voltaire,” where an allusion to “the Prophet’s gourd” allows Carlyle to compare the foreseeable “insignificance and oblivion” of Voltaire and the disappearance of the Pharoahs to the lasting legacy of Moses and the future accomplishments of “Mahomet, in his youthful years, ‘travelling to the horse-fairs of Syria’” (398). Somewhat less friendly to Islam is Carlyle’s injunction in “On History Again” to adopt serviceable rules for remembering; and keep at a safe distance from
us all such fantastic possibilities;—into which only some foolish Mahometan Caliph, ducking his head in a bucket of enchanted water, and so beating out one wet minute into seven long years of servitude and hardship, could fall. (19–20)

Two comparative analogies published after Heroes evince a similar oscillation between positive and more attenuated attitudes towards Islam. On the one hand, in Past and Present Carlyle compares “this haggard epoch, with its ghastly Doctrines, and death’s-head Philo-sophies ‘teaching by example’ or otherwise” to the pre-Islamic period Muslims call “‘the Period of Ignorance’” (239), while, on the other hand, in “Jesuitism,” another Latter-Day Pamphlet, he characterizes the grouse-hunting season as the dilettante aristocracy’s version of “ramadhan,” which is hardly edified by the analogy (295–96).

Carlyle’s passing allusions to aspects of Islam are also ambiguous, though collectively more positive. The reputation of the Koran benefits, for example, from its passing association with Scott’s Waverley novels and the English Bible in “Corn Law Rhymes” and in “Biography” with Homer’s Iliad (165; 51). Harder to interpret is Carlyle’s reference, through Teufelsdröckh, to Mecca in Sartor Resartus (1833–34):

As I stood in the Mosque of St. Sophia, and looked upon these Four-and-Twenty Tailors, sewing and embroidering that rich Cloth, which the Sultan sends yearly for the Caaba of Mecca, I thought within myself: How many other Unholies has your covering Art made holy, besides this Arabian Whinstone! (213)

On the one hand, the metaphysics of signification in Sartor state that everything holy is made so by being appropriately clothed and reverently worshipped; on the other hand, the tone of the passage implies that Mecca ranks as an extrinsically, rather than intrinsically, valuable symbol and therefore is inherently less holy and more likely to become obsolete. The two incidental references to Islam in Chartism are similarly ambiguous. In one passage, Islam is associated with Puritanism in being honored by God (179), whereas in another “Mahometanism” is proffered, almost incredulously, as an example of something whose pro-
longed “existence among men” proves it to have “truth and worth” that “were not semblances but realities” (165). Very occasionally, Carlyle’s references to aspects of Islam in his collected works reproduce popular stereotypes. In “Life and Writings of Werner,” for instance, he anticipates the charge of sensuousness only half-heartedly refuted in “The Hero as Prophet” by superciliously alluding to the Islamic practice of polygamy (129).

The broader context provided by these images of Islam in Carlyle’s work leads to some preliminary conclusions about his attitude towards Islam and suggests some areas for future research in this greatly neglected area of Carlyle studies. First, whatever role Carlyle may have played in the reformation of modern attitudes towards Islam, his thinking remains limited by and vulnerable to the prejudices of his period. Islam never becomes, even in “The Hero as Prophet,” an object worthy of study on its own merits for Carlyle, who nevertheless remains consistently fascinated with it enough to deploy images of Islam readily for instrumental and rhetorical purposes elsewhere in his writings. Because he does not investigate Islam or the Arab-Islamic world in detail, however, his references tend towards the undifferentiated and monolithic; for instance, one finds little awareness of those differences between the Shiite and Sunni branches of Islam—not to mention the even finer distinctions among the Imamis, Zaidis, and Isma’ilis within Shi’ism—that have become so prominent in contemporary events in the Middle East. Second, despite his lingering discomfort with aspects of Islamic faith and culture—polygamy, for example—Carlyle’s attitude seems to have become slightly more positive after the publication of Heroes. His distressingly negative turn in “The Hero as Poet” intimates that he may not have been entirely at ease with this shift in his own thinking, but the tone of later references in Past and Present and Latter-Day Pamphlets implies that he found Islam more congenial upon further reflection.

Any definitive arguments about Carlyle’s attitude towards Islam or his place in the history of Western perceptions of the Near East doubtless require further research. Particularly pressing are the need for a comprehensive historical account of English practices, perceptions, and
popular representations of Islam in the first half of the nineteenth century and a survey of Carlyle’s effects on the attitudes of his contemporary audience towards this area. Since popular perceptions of Islam, accurate or not, profoundly affected British foreign policy—including shaping public responses to the Afghan War and the Indian Mutiny—such further research could aid in evaluating the extent of Carlyle’s possible influence on British imperial expansion in the Islamic world.

WORKS CITED


“Carlyle scholars might begin by taking a closer look at his known sources for “The Hero as Prophet”; in his notes Goldberg lists works by Edward Gibbon, Humphrey Prideau, Edward Pococke, Hugo Grotius and George Sale (257). In addition, Carlyle’s friendly borrowing from Mahomet in a letter to Emerson, dated 8 April 1854 (CL 29:59), suggests there are likely more references to Islam in his letters. Finally, apRoberts also highlights Goethe’s engagement


