

# God-Intoxicated Men: Religion and Drunkenness in Carlyle's Works

James Evans  
Cardiff University

## I. THE DIONYSIAC MAGIC

In *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches* (1845) Thomas Carlyle describes his hero as “‘A god-intoxicated man,’ as Novalis elsewhere phrases it. I have asked myself, if anywhere in Modern European history, or even in ancient Asiatic, there was found a man practicing this mean world's affairs with a heart more filled with the Idea of the Highest” (714).

Carlyle's conception of religion draws heavily on imagery of intoxication and ecstatic transport. The juxtaposition of spiritual fulfillment and drunkenness has biblical antecedents, notably in Paul's injunction: “And be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess; but be filled with the Spirit” (Eph. 5:18). However, the idea of becoming “god-intoxicated” also summons to mind the pre-Christian substrata of pagan mystery religions.

An obvious reference point for these older religious experiences is Nietzsche's essay *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), which Albert J. LaValley compares with Carlyle's work on ancient “Dionysiac” religion. Like Carlyle, Nietzsche argues that “man's very roots with nature have been ne-

glected,” and offers the vision of “instinctual man alive with energies and sharply contrasted to the weakness of a dead culture” (LaValley 172). For Nietzsche the intoxication of Dionysiac experience offers an ideal image of the revitalized unity of man and nature: “Not only is the bond between man and man sealed by the Dionysiac magic: alienated, hostile or subjugated nature, too, celebrates her reconciliation with her lost son, man” (17).

When Carlyle, in his *Lectures on the History of Literature* (1837), imagines the dawn of European religion, he similarly argues that euphoric communion with transcendental forces represents the primal character of religion. He suggests that this was the central meaning of the ritual practice of the Greeks’ “rude pagan church”: “No matter how this was carried on, by divination or otherwise, so long as the individual suffered himself to be rapt in union with a higher being” (13).

This is the cornerstone of all religion as Carlyle conceives it. Religion first emerges not as a moral or ethical code, but as the headier experience of being “rapt in union.” However, it is important to note that the experience is significant not just for itself, but because the sense of union acquired subsequently spreads outwards to become the basis of social union. Once the initiate of the cult has gained the enraptured embrace of “a higher being,” the experience serves to bind together “the mind of the whole nation” (13). As in Nietzsche’s account, one sees “the bond between man and man sealed by the Dionysiac magic.” If communion is the essence of Carlyle’s vision of religion, it is also an extremely community-based religion and a practical force for order and alliance.

As noted, Carlyle borrowed the phrase “a god-intoxicated man” from Novalis. Novalis used it to describe Baruch Spinoza (Kluckhohn and Samuel 3:651). That Carlyle allocates Novalis’s tag to Oliver Cromwell, from Spinoza, signifies the different emphasis of his religious imagination. Spinoza personifies thought in its purest, ascetic form—his rationalistic pantheism paints an abstract picture of the absolute, purged of the untidiness of the everyday world.

Cromwell, by contrast, is an actor on the stage of history and a pragmatic leader of men. He has none of Spinoza’s meditative, de-

tached unworldliness—the “mean World’s affairs” are his business. Yet it is he whom Carlyle feels is most in contact with “the Highest” things.

As argued in Carlyle’s account of twelfth-century Catholicism in *Past and Present* (1843), the true religion is active, shared, and worldly. Carlyle approves of the apparent secularity and worldliness of Jocelin of Brakelond’s chronicle, since it is “in the world that a man, devout or other, has his life to lead, his work waiting to be done” (115). Union between man and the higher powers he courts and propitiates, and union between man and man, the bond of society, are two facets of the same religious fact. The etymological root of “religion” suggests binding, and Carlylean religion represents binding in both senses.

The necessarily social character of religion is further underlined in Carlyle’s meditations in his journal. He offers this simple definition: “Religion, the cement of society” (*Two* 179). This makes religion seem like a necessary but functional aspect of human existence.

In his more hortatory moments, however, Carlyle hints at a more esoteric definition of the relationship between religion and society: essentially, they are the same thing. The congregating-together of people is an implicitly religious act, whether it is intended or acknowledged as such. As he writes elsewhere in his journal, “Religion, as Novalis hints, is a social thing. Without a Church there can be little or no Religion. The action of mind on mind is mystical, infinite; Religion, worship can hardly (perhaps not at all) support itself without this aid” (149). A line from *The French Revolution* (1837) merges the ideas of religious and social union: “wherever two or three are gathered together, there are formed modes of existing together, habitudes, observances, nay gracefulnesses, joys!” (270).

Religion is the expression of the community’s imaginative life. Ruth apRoberts argues that for Carlyle,

God, the devil, hell, are linguistic inventions that reify in images the felt experience of a society. They are the Ancient Dialect of unconscious metaphor. When we recognize them as metaphorical, we do not thereby invalidate them but see them as part of the inval-

able human tradition of religious myth, or “poetry.” (103)

Religious doctrine may have only a metaphorical truth, but the emotional core of religion is a genuine human force, manifested in the existence of society. However, if religion is pressed into its social context with such firmness that god and society are almost conflated, it raises certain questions. If “god” is only a metaphor, what becomes of the “god-intoxicated man”?

If “god” is the reification of communal experience, then the intoxicant is surely the community. The divine intoxication of being “rapt in union with a higher being” is inseparable from the intoxication of being united with society.

This is difficult and interesting, because in the human, social context drunkenness is often depicted by Carlyle as a symbol of the degeneracy of society. Carlyle’s condemnation of the modern world accords an important place to the malign effects of drink. In *Chartism* (1839) he writes that gin is

justly named the most authentic incarnation of the Infernal Principle in our times, too indisputable an incarnation; Gin the black throat into which wretchedness of every sort, consummating itself by calling on delirium to help it, whirls down; abdication of the power to think or resolve, as too painful now, on the part of men whose lot of all others would require thought and resolution; liquid madness sold at tenpence the quartern. (144)

Madness, delirium, “abdication of the power to think” are all here offered as symptoms of the working classes’ gin-fueled self-annihilation. However, the vital energies that are unleashed in drunkenness are inseparable from those at work in the divine intoxication. Chris Vanden Bossche notes that “Carlyle was well aware that the sincere mystic who claimed divine inspiration could just as easily be a deluded madman” (48). If, to put it in pseudo-Carlylean terms, there is both a “celestial” and an “infernal” drunkenness, the dividing line between them is far from clear.

## II. THE FEAST OF SOULS

In "The Stump-Orator" Carlyle sardonically summarizes the democratic age as "Parliament and the election beer-barrel, and a course that leads men very high indeed" (172). The beer-barrel used for the purpose of bribery at electoral hustings resonates back and forth throughout *Latter-Day Pamphlets* (1850) as a symbol of the inadequacies of all reforming visions that base themselves upon notions of democracy.

Whilst such political reform can accord nominal political freedoms to men, it cannot free them from the fetters of moral slavery, represented by the beer-barrel. At one point, Carlyle addresses, via an imaginary mouthpiece, the sottish, indigent poor: "By all human definitions and conceptions of the said fight of freedom, you for your part have lost it . . . by imperfect energy and redundant appetite, by doing too little work and drinking too much beer, you (I bid you observe) have proved that you cannot do it!" ("Present" 40). Abandoning their moral free will and surrendering themselves to their base biological promptings, men have become as unfree as animals or deterministic automatons.<sup>1</sup> Indulgence of their appetites represents the opposite of a demonstration of free will: "Not 'free' you, I think, whoever may be free. You palpably are fallen captive,—*caitiff*, as they once named it" (40).

Carlyle symbolizes this loss of volition in his recurring image of the "St.Vitus' dance." In the degraded modern age, he writes, the common mind "is all tortured into St.Vitus dances, and ghastly merry-andrewisms" ("New" 161). The nervous tic of the "St.Vitus' dance" appears in the broken movements of people who have been deprived of their free will and are fatalistically in the grip of an involuntary impulse. This is symptomatic of society's lifelessness. Professor Teufels-

<sup>1</sup>Samuel Thomas Bigelow convincingly argues that Carlyle's definition of free will owes less to philosophy than it does to Calvinist theology, which distinguishes between true freedom (the freedom to obey the will of God) and

dröckh in *Sartor Resartus* (1833–34) describes modern society as “animated only by a Galvanic vitality” (159). Here, then, one seems to see the beer-sodden terminal degeneration of society.

At the other end of the ethnological spectrum from Carlyle’s degraded Irish paupers and the British workers who are gradually being brought down to the same level stands the German race. Carlyle’s teutophile inclinations need no rehearsing. In his aborted history of German literature he depicts the life of the German race as a continuous thread of honest, silent virtue in the gaudy tapestry of European history and suggests that these stout Germanic qualities are destined to redeem Europe from its contemporary drift into eleutheromania and chaos. Even in Tacitus’s day, “in their dark forests already dwelt the future regenerators of Europe” (Shine 15).

However, these pious Germans are by no means puritans. They have their vices, which “do not belie this character, but rather naturally grow out of it,” and which oddly recall the vices of the degenerate modern society Carlyle depicts. Chief among these is “an inordinate passion for social excitement; fierce gambling, and that excess, which in tavern language is still said to be ‘the feast of souls’ but in the vulgar dialect is still called Drunkenness” (18–19).

The Teutonic drunkenness springs from a surplus of vitality and expresses the animal vigor of the German society. The “feast of souls” aptly describes the hearty communion of the rugged organic community of the ancient “dark forests” in contrast to the pallid alienation of the contemporary European society that Carlyle castigated. The wild drunkenness of the Germans is a genuine communion of the “demos,” as opposed to the “electoral beer-barrel” of the doomed modern democracy, which separates and isolates people rather than bringing them together. Yet the two images parallel each other suggestively.

These parallels between noble, healthy intoxication and brutish intoxication can be furthered. Drunkenness represents the act of yielding to madness, but madness is not without a certain significance to Carlyle. He writes in *Past and Present* that “highest Wisdom, struggling up into this world, has oftentimes carried such tinctures and adhesions

of Insanity” (206). Similarly, gin is “liquid madness,” but when Carlyle describes the supreme moment when society unites itself in unadulterated hero-worship of its greatest man, he uses the term “deliquium” to describe the dissolution of the individual worshiper’s consciousness into boundless and fierce emotion (*Heroes* 38). A form of liquid madness seems to be the highest form of hero-worship.

Drunkenness is “Delirium,” but in his account of the French revolutionaries, “rapt along” by their sense of destiny, Carlyle writes that “a man . . . becomes as it were enveloped in an ambient atmosphere of Transcendentalism and Delirium: his individual self is lost in something that is not himself, but foreign though inseparable from him” (*French* 3:121). “Transcendentalism,” by which man can rise above his “individual self” to realize something greater, goes hand in hand with “Delirium.”

Drunkenness can make men animalistic. Animals, on the other hand, are free of the enervating self-consciousness that brings about the dysfunction of the modern self and modern society. In *The French Revolution* Carlyle writes:

men and soldiers love intrepidity and swift inflexible decision, even when they suffer by it. As indeed is not this fundamentally the quality of qualities for a man? A quality which by itself is next to nothing, since inferior animals, asses, dogs, even mules have it; yet, in due combination, it is the indispensable basis of all. (3:85)

The purpose, unity, and force of an animal are akin to the qualities conferred upon a man by the animating qualities of divine rapture. Of course, Carlyle adds that the “swift inflexible decision” that animals possess is “by itself next to nothing.” Yet the crude, animal condition of existence still bears an odd resemblance to the ideal condition of human existence. Higher and lower qualities are inter-trammelled in the same way that celestial and infernal drunkenness defy easy separation.

The most important similarity of both types of intoxication is the way that both supersede and override rational consciousness and thought.

Alcoholic indulgence represents “abdication of the power to think,” but as Carlyle tells himself in his notebooks (quoting Aristotle), “The End of Man is an Action, not a Thought” (*Two* 81). Thought which does not issue in deeds is barren. Modern self-consciousness, as he argues at length in “Characteristics” is disastrous. Only by a rejection of arid rationalism and a recovery of the intoxication of faith and belief can the health and vitality of society be restored. But as the paradoxical similarities between the rude health of the German people and the torpor of the modern British suggest, such intoxication is bound to be a double-edged sword.

### III. DANCING BACCHANTES

Carlyle’s *The French Revolution* represents his most detailed account of the renewal of society through the rebirth of faith. He argues that the import of the revolution is principally religious: “here is the miracle. Out of that putrescent rubbish of Scepticism, Sensualism, Sentimentalism, hollow Machiavelism, such a faith has verily risen; flaming in the heart of a people” (4:219).

Carlyle’s description of the mass experience of this rebirth of faith draws heavily on imagery of intoxication, both sublime and brutish. In a proleptic moment at the beginning of his history, Carlyle writes, “On the Fifth of May, fifteen years hence, old Louis will not be sending for the Sacraments; but a new Louis, his grandson, with the whole pomp of astonished intoxicated France, will be opening the States-General” (2:29). The miraculous wonderment and violent intoxication of the nation go hand-in-hand throughout the history.

The primal irrationalism of the new faith is emphasized by the fact that it takes form even as the revolutionaries attempt to initiate a new social order, and ultimately a new state religion, founded entirely on enlightened rationalism. When “the first of the Feasts of Reason; first communion-service of the New Religion of Chaumette” is held in Paris (4:228), Carlyle’s account emphasizes the Dionysian riot taking place beneath the robes of respectable classicality. The outcome of the festival undercuts the pretensions of rationalism. When the Convention

processes towards Notre-Dame, Carlyle describes “Reason, again in her litter, sitting in the van of them, borne, as one judges, by men in the Roman costume; escorted by wind-music, red nightcaps, and the madness of the world” (4:228). Reason is paired with madness and delirium.

The true religious revival is happening behind the officially staged scenes of the cult of Reason’s inauguration and is orgiastic and chaotic. Carlyle quotes Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s account of the festivities in the Church of Saint-Eustache, which “offered the spectacle of a great tavern,” as “dancers nigh bare of breeches, neck and breast naked, stockings down, went whirling and spinning, like those Dust-vortexes, forerunners of Tempest and Destruction” (4:228).

Frenzied, intoxicated dancing of this sort is one of the defining actions of Carlyle’s account of the revolution. On several occasions he refers to the tone of the revolution as “Pythian.” The word once again refers one to the divine intoxications of the mystery cults of antiquity—in this case the Delphic cult and its associated frenzies—and Carlyle employs it on several occasions to describe the mania that descends upon France. He rebuts the idea that the Revolution was an attempt to realize Christianity practically by foregrounding, by way of implicit contrast, the ancient demonic and religious character of the animation that seizes the people: “as if Twenty-five millions, risen at length into the Pythian mood, had stood up simultaneously to say, with a sound which goes through far lands and times, that this Untruth of an Existence had become insupportable” (4:204–05).

Such Pythian frenzy seems to step into the breach when human conventions are abandoned as unworkable: “The old habits are gone to wreck because they were old: men, driven forward by Necessity and fierce Pythian Madness, have, on the spur of the instant, to devise for the want the way of satisfying it” (4:206). The “Pythian Madness” represents a state of primal human energy, creative and destructive.

Similarly, the “Insurrection of Women” is described in terms of the maenadic Dionysian cults of antiquity. For Carlyle, this event is one of the Revolution’s genuine “unpremeditated outbursts of Nature,” next to which the contrived theatricalities of the revolution’s self-conscious

leaders are uninspiring “small beer” (3:49). Once again, the women stand as a representation of primal human nature in all its glory and horror:

Here too, as we said, is Human Nature once more human; shudder at it whoso is of shuddering humor; yet, behold, it is human. It has “swallowed all formulas;” it tripudiates even so. For which reason they that collect Vases and Antiques, with figures of Dancing Bacchantes “in wild and all but impossible positions,” may look with some interest on it. (2:288)

These dancing insurrectionaries are a testament to the ineradicable bedrock of human nature. Their “tripudiations” are echoed in Carlyle’s broader theme of Sansculottism’s “ragged Pythian Carmagnole-dance” (4:310). Carlyle draws upon the image of these frenzied, primal dances to represent the form which human nature takes in the raw conditions of revolution.

The mad, intoxicated Pythian-bacchic dance of the revolutionaries parallels the helpless “St.Vitus’ Dance” of the degraded British working classes. In both cases, a distracted, frenetic, and involuntary energy has taken hold of the people. However, whilst the French revolutionary chaos is human and vital, the modern British agitations are moribund and subhuman. Yet once again, the two conditions seem to parallel each other very closely, meeting in the hinterland of “Transcendentalism” and “Delirium,” beyond the bounds of language.

Part of the distinction between the two phenomena are Carlyle’s indications that the energy unleashed in the process of *The French Revolution* is not merely madness. The chaos of the revolution strives towards order and form and can be controlled by anyone who is capable of imbuing it with these qualities by identifying with it.

Usher Maillard manages to control the women’s insurrection by beating a drum. The wild energy of these maenads is dangerous and threatening: “If such hewed off the melodious head of Orpheus, and hurled it into the Peneus waters, what may they not make of thee,—

thee rhythmic merely, with no music but a sheepskin drum!" But Maillard is able to master that force, by identifying himself with it and claiming leadership of it: "Their inarticulate frenzy," Carlyle tells Maillard, "thou must, on the spur of the instant, render into articulate words, into actions that are not frantic" (2:255).

In the same fashion that Maillard articulates the insurrection into coherence, the leaders of the revolution as a whole achieve their position by identification with the drives and desires of the primal energy from below, from the people, which fuels the revolution. Their principal qualification as leaders is that "of divining aright what this great dumb Whirlwind wishes and wills; that of willing, with more frenzy than any one, what all the world wills" (4:232). By being swept up in the frenzy, these men are paradoxically able to give it shape, order, and stability.

Like the initiates of the original Bacchic and Pythian mysteries, the man who loses himself in this intoxicated frenzy attains an identification of the "higher being" with himself—he becomes the representative and embodiment of society. This is almost akin to a process of deification, where the "god-intoxicated man" is filled and transfigured by the power and the presence of the "higher being."

#### IV. DRUNK MORTALS

Such a process of transfiguration is more fully imagined in *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History* (1841), where Carlyle imagines the admiration of the Norse people for Odin reaching a literal "apotheosis" as he is transfigured in their eyes into a god:

With all men reverently admiring him; with his own wild soul full of noble ardours and affections, of whirlwind chaotic darkness and glorious new light; a divine Universe bursting all into godlike beauty round him, and no man to whom the like ever had befallen, what could he think himself to be? "Wuotan?" All men answered, "Wuotan!" (23)

The visionary quality of this moment, the “bursting” Universe, and the acclaim of “all men” underline the fact that this is the supreme moment of religious revelation in Carlyle’s writing. Man is rapt into godhood by the communion of reverent admiration from his fellow man. This is the truest “god-intoxication” Carlyle describes.

The fact that this moment is imagined only in the prehistoric Norse past highlights the difficulties in the concept. The French Revolution does not produce any men of truly godlike stature in Carlyle’s account—its best, Mirabeau and Danton, are swept away without achieving mastery over the “Whirlwind,” and that mastery eventually falls into the hands of its worst, men such as Robespierre.

This is perhaps why the modern “St. Vitus’ Dance” has for Carlyle none of the vitality of the French Revolution’s Pythian frenzies. In his later works, dealing with contemporary social problems, he is more doubtful as to whether such energies can be controlled and channelled or are merely a force for chaos. In Carlyle’s earlier writings, the intoxicated and intoxicating energy of the people represents a positive force, a dynamism that can be harnessed and mastered. Later in his career, Carlyle tends to emphasize simply the need to control this energy and to resist its inducements to sympathetic frenzy in oneself.

Hence, in his two major histories after *The French Revolution* Carlyle reduces the emphasis on the hero ruling through his identification with the people. Cromwell suffers from “nervous dreams, almost semi-madness,” because of “the depth and tenderness of his wild affections; the quantity of *sympathy* he had with things” (*Heroes* 187). His “god-intoxication” is another expression of the “sympathy” and identification he feels with other men. But, ultimately, Cromwell’s task is to impose order upon this chaos, even at the expense of the people and their wishes. He is not spontaneously apotheosized by the people but gains leadership of the country through strength and prowess and imposes order and discipline upon it.

Cromwell, like Usher Maillard, is charged with articulating the frenzy of the people into order and shape. Nonetheless, the emphasis in the later history is different. The drumbeat of order takes on its own logic. This is even more the case with *Frederick the Great*

(1858–65), where the hero-king, rather than being exalted by the love of the people, is doomed to remain comparatively unknown to them. Carlyle writes of Friedrich: “Tremulous sensibilities, ardent affections; these we clearly discover in him, in extraordinary vivacity; but he wears them under his polished panoply, and is outwardly a radiant but metallic object to mankind” (14:385). Order replaces intoxication as the basis of society.

In “Shooting Niagara,” Carlyle suggests that the drummed rhythms of military drill form a model of the entire social order. It is his final suggestion for the reform of society in his final essay on the subject: “From correct marching in line, to rhythmic dancing in cotillon or minuet . . . there is a natural charm in it; the fulfilment of a deep-seated, universal desire, to all rhythmic social creatures!” (42).

Carlyle describes “combined rhythmic action” as supplying a strangely profound satisfaction and suggests that people would spontaneously embrace such activity if it were introduced to them:

I believe the vulgarest Cockney crowd, flung out million-fold on a Whit-Monday, with nothing but beer and dull folly to depend on for amusement, would at once kindle into something human, if you set them to do almost any regulated act in common. And would dismiss their beer and dull foolery in the silent charm of rhythmic human companionship. (43)

The basis of religion was the experience of being “rapt in union with a higher being.” The higher being is, fundamentally, society. A man who is exalted by other men becomes a leader and experiences a religious sense of apotheosis. In “Shooting Niagara” and Carlyle’s other late works, the emphasis has changed. Here the disparate units of society are welded together by the imposition of order, regulation, and drilled discipline upon them. Each member of society, by participating in “rhythmic human companionship,” enters a form of ritualized “union with a higher being.” Carlyle’s imagined “Cockney crowd” gladly dismisses its beer in favor of such a union—order, rather than frenzy, has become the true intoxication.

A more abstract unity, the unity of political centralization, martial order, and strong leadership, is substituted for the unity of spontaneous identification of man with man.

This is in many ways a safer vision. The mutual intoxication of the hero and the people threatens death as much as it promises apotheosis. Creation and destruction are finally inseparable aspects of the same force.

The mingled fear and desire of popular adulation that distinguish Carlyle's attitude toward the relationship of ruler and people also inform his attitude toward his own public. One of his most powerful images of the writer who becomes drunk on his own acclaim comes in his account of the triumphant return of Voltaire to Paris. Here, the *fêted philosophe* is met by the unbounded hero-worship of the Parisians, which serves to "stifle him under roses" (*Heroes* 13). In his essay on Voltaire, Carlyle describes it as a "death by lightning, a sacred death, a death from the gods, from their many-headed god, POPULARITY." Voltaire, who "thirsted after public favor" (437), receives it in spiritually and literally fatal superabundance and ends "rapt in the whirlwinds and thick ghastly vapors of death" (444).

The dangers and lures of social intoxication are seen in Carlyle's 1830 essay on "Jean Paul Friedrich Richter," where he writes:

sudden tumultuous popularity comes more from partial delirium on both sides than from clear insight; and is of evil omen to all concerned with it. How many loud Bacchus-festivals of this sort have we seen prove to be pseudo-Bacchanalia, and end in directly the inverse of Orgies! Drawn by his team of lions, the jolly god advances as a real god, with all his thyrsi, cymbals, phallophori and Maenadic women; the air, the earth, is giddy with their clangor, their Evohes: but, alas, in a little while, the lion-team shows long-ears, and becomes too clearly an ass-team in lion-skins; the Maenads wheel round in amazement; and then the jolly god, dragged from his chariot, is trodden into the kennels as a drunk mortal. (97)

The “delirium” of the public and the man they are deifying is depicted in terms of Dionysian intoxication and a great release of the vital eros of society. Bedecked with fertility symbols, lions, and “Maenadic women” who represent the consubstantiality of mankind with nature and its raw energies, the acclaimed man is drawn towards his apotheosis as “a real god.” But the Bacchanalia is stripped of its “Dionysiac magic.” The god-intoxicated man is exposed as only a “drunk mortal,” and the strength and power of the identification with nature’s energies represented by the lion-team are replaced by the degrading, comic image of the “ass-team,” man dragged down to nature rather than exalted by it. Like Dionysus, the exalted man is now destroyed by his own Maenads—the creative powers of nature yield place to the destructive.

James Eli Adams suggests that part of the reason for Carlyle’s more uncompromising severity in his later works is a need to feel alienated and distanced from his public. In George Levine’s words, Carlyle’s “rhetoric preserves the integrity of the rebarbative prophet by distancing an increasingly eager public embrace of the sage of Chelsea” (qtd. in Adams 220). On the other hand, Carlyle’s earlier works were also (wilfully) inaccessibly innovative to his first readers. In his criticism of *Sartor Resartus*, John Sterling highlighted Carlyle’s stylistic tendency towards a “startling whirl of incongruous juxtaposition, which of a truth must to many readers seem as amazing as if the Pythia on the tripod should have struck up a drinking-song” (*Life* 114). Ultimately, this drinking-song remained a solo performance; Carlyle one way or another managed to steer clear of the divine intoxication of becoming universally adulated.

#### WORKS CITED

- Adams, James Eli. “The Hero as Spectacle: Carlyle and the Persistence of Dandyism.” *Victorian Literature and the Victorian Visual Imagination*. Ed. Carol T. Christ and John O. Jordan. Berkeley: U of California P, 1995. 213–32.

- apRoberts, Ruth. *The Ancient Dialect: Thomas Carlyle and Comparative Religion*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1988.
- Bigelow, Samuel Thomas. "Thomas Carlyle's Notion of the Unconscious and Its Influence on His Early Writings." Diss. Claremont Graduate School, 1973.
- Carlyle, Thomas. *Chartism*. 1839. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 29.
- . *Frederick the Great*. 1858-65. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vols. 12-19.
- . *The French Revolution*. 1837. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vols. 2-4.
- . "Jean Paul Friedrich Richter." *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 27. 96-159.
- . *Latter-Day Pamphlets*. 1850. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 20.
- . *Lectures on the History of Literature*. 1837. Ed. J. Reay Greene. London: Ellis and Elvey, 1892.
- . *The Life of John Sterling*. 1851. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 11.
- . *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches*. 1845. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vols. 6-9.
- . *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History*. 1841. Ed. Michael K. Goldberg, Joel J. Brattin, and Mark Engel. Berkeley: U of California P, 1993.
- . *Past and Present*. 1843. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 10.
- . "The Present Time." 1851. *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 20. 1-47.
- . *Sartor Resartus*. 1833-34. Ed. Rodger L. Tarr and Mark Engel. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000.
- . "Shooting Niagara." *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 30. 1-48.
- . "The Stump-Orator." *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-99. Vol. 20. 172-213.
- . *Two Note Books of Thomas Carlyle*. 1898. Ed. Charles Eliot Norton. Ma-

- maroneck, NY: Paul P. Appel, 1972.
- . “Voltaire.” *Works*. 30 vols. Ed. H. D. Traill. London: Chapman and Hall, 1896–99. Vol. 26. 396–468.
- Kluckhohn, Paul, and R. H. Samuel, eds. *Novalis Schriften*. 5 vols. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960–88.
- LaValley, Albert J. *Carlyle and the Idea of the Modern: Studies in Carlyle’s Prophetic Literature and Its Relation to Blake, Nietzsche, Marx, and Others*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1968.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy*. 1872. Trans. Shaun Whiteside. Ed. Michael Tanner. London: Penguin, 1993.
- Shine, Hill, ed. *Carlyle’s Unfinished History of German Literature*. 1951. New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1973.
- Vanden Bossche, Chris. *Carlyle and the Search for Authority*. Columbus: The Ohio State UP, 1991.